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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 51 SUMMER 1977 NUMBER 4
THE CONTAINER REVOLUTION AND THE
$500 PACKAGE LIMITATION-CONFLICTING
APPROACHES AND UNREALISTIC
SOLUTIONS: A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
JOSEPH A. CALAMARI*
Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)
limits a carrier's liability for damages incurred in the transportation
of cargo to $500 per "package" or "customary freight unit."1 Unfor-
tunately, in enacting section 4(5),2 Congress provided little guidance
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University; A.B., Fordham University, 1939;
LL.B., Fordham Law School, 1942; LL.M., New York University, 1949.
I The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) § 4(5), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970), provides
in pertinent part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any
loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount
exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods
not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum
in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by
the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This declaration, if
embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be
conclusive on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier, and the
shipper another maximum amount than that mentioned in this paragraph may be
fixed: Provided, That such maximum shall not be less than the figure above named.
In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the amount of damage actually
sustained.
COGSA is in essence a verbatim adoption of a 1921 international agreement known as
the "Hague Rules." See notes 17-23 and accompanying text infra. Its central purpose is to
"establish international uniformity in certain matters relating to ocean bills of lading, on a
basis fair to ocean carriers, cargo owners, insurers and bankers." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960, 962 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). While
the agreement was a compromise among these varying interests, see notes 33-35 and accom-
panying text infra, it is generally agreed that COGSA was intended to correct a perceived
inequity in bargaining power between carriers and cargo interests. This was accomplished by
establishing a minimum amount of liability which cannot be contracted away. Since this
ensures that the cargo interests have certain enforceable rights against carriers, the value and
negotiability of ocean bills has been enhanced. See G. GuLMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 145, 147 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GimoRE & BLACK]; Simon, The Law
of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 507, 518-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Simon].
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as to the meaning of the term package. As a result, the courts have
been left to grapple with the problem of fashioning an intelligible,
understandable, and rationally acceptable definition of this term.'
This formidable judicial task has been further complicated by the
container revolution which has taken place in the shipping indus-
try.' By virtue of this occurrence, ever-increasing demands have
been made upon the courts to resolve the question whether a con-
tainer is a package within the meaning of section 4(5) and thereby
subject, as a single unit, to the $500 limitation of liability.'
This narrow but significant issue in admiralty law was recently
addressed by a district court in the Ninth Circuit. In Matsushita
Electric Corp. of America v. S.S. Aegis Spirit,6 the plaintiff, a con-
See also Hearings on S. 1152 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935).
' For a discussion of the confusion and conflict which has arisen concerning the meaning
of the term package see DeOrchis, The Container and the Package Limitation-The Search
for Predictability, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DeOrchis]; Simon,
supra note 2; van Wageningen, Interpreting COGSA: The Meaning of "'Package", 30 U. MIANi
L. REv. 169 (1975) [hereinafter cited as van Wageningen].
Containerization is a method of shipping cargo which became popular in the 1960's as
a means of eliminating time-consuming and expensive manual loading and unloading of cargo
at dockside and as a more efficient method of on-board stowage. Briefly, a container is a
permanent reusable article of transport equipment usually provided by the carrier which may
be up to 40 feet long by 8 feet high and 8 feet wide. It permits the loading of goods at inland
points with the container being moved by truck or rail to shipside and loaded on board by
giant cranes, ultimately to be delivered by truck or rail to another inland destination and
unloaded there. See GiLmORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 14; Simon, supra note 2, at 510-14.
For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of containerization in the shipping industry see
notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra.
I Carriers using containers, joined by virtually all ocean conferences, maintained that
the container is a package within the meaning of COGSA and the Hague Rules and limited
their liability to $500 per container, thereby virtually insulating themselves from liability. As
a result, the issue has been extensively litigated. See Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and
Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 203, 222-23 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Schmeltzer & Peavy].
The only court of appeals to have specifically addressed the container-package question
is the Second Circuit. See Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 1976
A.M.C. 487 (2d Cir. 1976); Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir.
1974); Shinko Boeki Co., Ltd. v. S.S. "Pioneer Moon," 507 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1974); Du Pont
de Nemours Int'l S.A. v. S.S. Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974); Royal Typewriter Co.
v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx,
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969).
Many district courts, however, have been confronted with the issue. See, e.g., Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of America v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Baby Togs,
Inc. v. S.S. American Ming, 1975 A.M.C. 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lucchese v. Malabe Shipping
Co., 351 F. Supp. 588 (D.P.R. 1972); Truck Ins. Exch. v. American Export Freight Inc., 1972
A.M.C. 2509 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Carribean Transp.,
Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
6 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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signee of a cargo of color televisions and stereophonic equipment,
entered into a contract with the defendant carrier, Tokai Shipping
Company, for transportation of the goods from Japan to the United
States. In preparation for shipment, the electrical equipment was
first packed in durable cardboard cartons by the shipper and then
loaded into eleven large reusable containers which had been pro-
vided by the carrier. Upon arrival in the United States, it was dis-
covered that the goods had been materially damaged during the
voyage, apparently due to the seepage of seawater into the contain-
ers.7 Relying upon earlier Ninth Circuit precedent involving noncon-
tainerized packages,8 the District Court for the Western District of
Washington held that the $500 per package limitation applied to the
individual cartons stored within the Tokai containers and not to the
containers as separate units.' Finding that this interpretation best
comports with the legislative policy embodied in COGSA and
"reflects the plain, ordinary meaning of [the] term [package],""
the Matsushita court refused to follow two recent decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which had
ruled that the intent of the parties is the touchstone of COGSA
liability."1
These divergent results are illustrative of the widespread judi-
cial disagreement concerning the proper construction of the word
package. To understand the judicial conflict surrounding the ap-
plicability of section 4(5) to containerized cargo, it will be helpful
to briefly examine COGSA's legislative background and the history
of containerization in the shipping industry.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Legislative Background
Under general maritime law, the carrier was regarded as an
insurer of the goods it carried and was absolutely liable for all cargo
Id. at 898.
Id. at 907 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), discussed in notes 61-64 and accompanying text
infra).
1 414 F. Supp. at 907. For a more detailed discussion of the Matsushita decision see notes
108-29 and accompanying text infra.
20 414 F. Supp. at 908.
Il The two decisions of the Second Circuit are Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion,
514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed in notes 92-99 and accompanying text infra, and Royal
Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in notes 77-91 and
accompanying text infra.
1977]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:687
losses and damages, with the exception of those occasioned by an
act of God or the public enemy. 2 During the nineteenth century,
American carriers, following the example of their English counter-
parts, began to insert exculpatory clauses in their bills of lading
exonerating them from all liability for cargo damage. 3 In an at-
tempt to remedy this situation, Congress enacted the Harter Act in
1893,11 which made it unlawful for any bill of lading to contain
provisions relieving a carrier from liability for its own lack of care. 5
This statute is silent, however, with respect to package limitation
clauses. Consequently, carriers inserted provisions in their bills of
lading limiting their liability to nominal amounts and thereby
thwarted the statutory objective. 6 As a result of outcries from the
international maritime community, 7 a voluntary agreement was
drafted at the Hague in 1921.18 Designed to protect cargo interests
in international shipping trade, the Hague Rules, as amended by
the Brussels Convention of 1924, provide for a monetary per package
limitation which cannot be decreased by carefully drafted clauses
in bills of lading. 9 The Hague Rules were adopted in substantial
" See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 139 and cases cited therein.
" See Simon, supra note 2, at 517-18.
" Harter Act, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1970)).
The Harter Act provides in part:
It shall not be lawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any vessel trans-
porting merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and
foreign ports to insert in any bill of lading . . . any clause . . . whereby . . . he
• . . shall be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence, fault,
or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery of any and
all lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their charge. Any and all
words or clauses of such import inserted in bills of lading . . . shall be null and
void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. § 190 (1970).
The primary purpose of the Harter Act is to protect cargo interests from damages due to
negligence or fault on the part of the carriers by preventing carriers from contracting away
potential liability. The Act is not totally one-sided, however, since it does stipulate that vessel
owners who use due diligence in making a ship seaworthy and ensuring that it is properly
manned and equipped are relieved from liability for damage caused by errors in navigation
or management of the vessel. Id. § 192. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 143.
j6 See Simon, supra note 2, at 518.
By limiting their liability to nominal amounts, carriers created a situation where an
ocean bill of lading became virtually worthless as commercial paper. International shippers
and importers, as well as the bankers who financed such shipments, were anxious to have
this situation remedied. See id.
" This voluntary agreement was made mandatory to all signatories in the revised version
promulgated in Brussels in 1924. Id.
" The relevant portions of the Hague Rules state:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with goods
arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in
this article, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this convention,
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part by the United States with the passage of COGSA in 1936.20
In essence, COGSA is a verbatim enactment of the Hague
Rules, but there is one significant difference between the two: the
Hague Rules limit carrier liability to $500 per package or unit, in
contrast to COGSA's per package or customary freight unit limita-
tion. Under the Hague Rules, it apparently makes little difference
whether an item is considered a package or an unpackaged unit
since the terms have been construed to have essentially the same
meaning.21 Conversely, under COGSA there is a significant differ-
ence between a package and a customary freight unit.2 2 In general,
a customary freight unit is the unit of quantity, weight, or measure-
ment upon which the shipping price is based. 3 Thus, if the shipping
shall be null and void and of no effect.
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any
loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding [$500] per
package or unit. . . unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared
by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
Hague iules, art. 3, § 8, art. 4, § 5, 51 Stat. 233, at 250-52 (1924), reprinted in A. KNAUTH,
OcEAN BILLs OF LADING (4th ed. 1953).
An international protocol revising the Hague Rules was passed in Brussels in 1968 by the
Twelfth Session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law. In addition to adopting a
limitation of liability of $662 per package or unit or 90 cents per pound, whichever is higher,
the protocol contains a provision stipulating:
[w]here a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate
goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading as packed
in such article of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for
the purpose of this paragraph ....
1968 Protocol to the Hague Rules, reprinted in Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 5, at 224. This
protocol has not as yet been ratified by the United States.
" Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 521, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified in 46
U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970)).
22 See van Wageningen, supra note 3, at 170. In a relatively recent case, the Supreme
Court of Canada stated that the term unit was intended to cover cargo such as a log of wood
or bar of metal which, while generally similar to a package, is not "packed up" in the precise
sense of a package. Accordingly, it held that an unpackaged tractor and generator were each
one unit and limited recovery to $1000. Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping
Ltd., 37 D.L.R.3d 546 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1973). The European courts are in accord with this
interpretation. See, e.g., Judgement of Feb. 7, 1949, [1950] DMF 126 Oran F.2d 1949 (Fr.)
(where 500 casks of wine each contained six hectoliters, the French court held the relevant
unit to be the cask).
21 As a general rule, a customary freight unit is a unit of quantity, weight, or measure-
ment upon which the shipping price is based. See Brazil Oiticica, Ltd. v. The Bill, 55 F. Supp.
780 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Lorentzen v. Brazil Oiticica, Inc., 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944).
When customary freight units are involved, a carrier's liability can be quite extensive. See
van Wageningen, supra note 3, at 171. For example, if the shipper's rate is based on the ton,
the ton would be the customary freight unit, and the carrier's liability would be the number
of tons multiplied by $500. Consequently, an expansive interpretation of the word package
favors carriers; conversely, a restrictive use of the term is beneficial to shippers.
2 See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1953); Brazil Oiticica,
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rate is per ton, the ton is the customary freight unit for section 4(5)
purposes, and the dollar liability under the Act is calculated by
multiplying the number of customary freight units by $500.
The History of Containerization in the Shipping Industry
COGSA was directed at the shipping procedures that were
prevalent at the time of its enactment. During that period most
freight was shipped either as breakbulk 4 or reefer cargo.5s These
procedures are both time consuming and costly since the cargo has
to be loaded manually onto the ship, protected from adverse move-
ment during voyage, and individually discharged on arrival.2 1 In-
creased mechanization and a desire to reduce costs motivated car-
riers to invest in the construction of large container ships. By stow-
ing cargo in permanent metal containers, which are lifted and
moved with giant cranes, carriers are able to facilitate the loading,
handling, and discharging of goods. Moreover, since containeriza-
tion eliminates the manual handling of cargo, it results in cost sav-
ings to the carrier and helps to ensure the safe transportation of
cargo.2 1
Ltd. v. The Bill, 55 F. Supp. 780, 783 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Lorentzen v. Brazil Oiticica,
Inc., 145 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1944). In General Motors Corp. v. S.S. Mormacoak, 327 F. Supp.
666 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 451
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), an entire power plant was held to be a customary freight
unit since the freight tariff was computed on a flat rate for each plant.
24 "Break-bulk" is the term used to refer to the method of loading and stowing cartons
or packages of cargo individually in the hold of the vessel. Sometimes these packages initially
will be stacked on a flat wooden tray or pallet and then moved by a forklift truck. See Simon,
supra note 2, at 510-11.
1 The transportation of perishable cargo requires special refrigerated compartments on
board the vessel, known as reefer compartments. Even where this is available, however, the
carrier has the problem of determining what kinds of perishable goods can be stored together
in the same compartment. There is also the additional problem of proper on-shore storage
facilities before and after loading. See C. POWERS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BIus OF LADING 64-
65 (1966).
26 In a typical carriage-by-sea transaction, the shipper transports his goods to port by
whatever means he chooses. Upon delivery at dockside, he receives a dock receipt. The carrier
then loads the goods aboard the vessel and issues a bill of lading. Next, the goods are shipped
to the port of destination and delivered to the holder of the bill of lading. Sometimes a shipper
will engage a freight forwarder who books space on the vessel, takes charge of the goods on
their arrival at port, sees them aboard the ship, and turns the bill of lading over to the shipper.
See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 13-14.
Not only is this manual handling costly in terms of the amount of labor and time
consumed, but at each step it increases the likelihood of damage to the cargo due to human
carelessness. See id.; Simon, supra note 2, at 510-11.
By utilizing containers, carriers have been able to reduce the time required to load and
unload general cargo on a conventional vessel from 3 days to 8 hours. See Schmeltzer & Peavy,
supra note 5, at 208. In addition, there are other advantages: container terminals can be
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When goods are shipped in intermodal containers, carriers
often will deliver the container to the shippers' premises and have
the shipper stow the cargo. This differs significantly from conven-
tional stowage where the shipper delivers the goods to the pier for
loading by the carrier. In addition, containerization permits the
shipper to know the exact environment in which the goods will be
shipped so he can package the goods accordingly. This often will
lead to an economic benefit for the shipper because he can forego
the expensive protective packaging required for breakbulk ship-
ping.2
With the advent of containerization, many carriers amended
their bills of lading to limit liability to $500 per container on the
theory that the container is a package under COGSA. The validity
of these clauses in bills of lading and the meaning of the word
package in section 4(5) is at the root of the container controversy.
THE PRECONTAINER CONTROVERSY
The Second Circuit, which has jurisdiction over an extensive
part of the shipping industry on the East Coast, and the Ninth
Circuit, which has similar jurisdiction over the West Coast, have
expounded almost entirely different interpretations of the term
package.29 On balance, the Second Circuit decisions appear more
favorable to the carrier and its economic privies, while the Ninth
Circuit determinations are supportive of the shipper and its asso-
ciates. The differences between these two courts stem from conflict-
located away from the congested inner city port areas; carriers do not need to maintain sheds
for storing cargo prior to loading; and the opportunity for pilferage is decreased. See id. at
206-09. Foreign commerce generally is simplified by the use of a "single interchangeable
transportation unit that can be carried via a combination of several modes of transportation,
under a single shipping document and a single freight charge, from the shipper's warehouse
to the consignee's warehouse." Bissell, The Operational Realities of Containerization and
Their Effect on the "Package" Limitation and the "On-deck" Prohibition: Review and
Suggestions, 45 TuL. L. REv. 902, 910 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bissell].
Containers are specially constructed to permit stacking one on top of another without
putting extraneous vertical stress on the packages within. Since the shipper often loads the
goods into the container himself, he need not worry about careless handling by the carrier.
Accordingly, since he knows and controls the physical environment and risks to which his
goods are to be subjected, he can eliminate the costly and superfluous packaging which was
once standard and employ a more economical but less sturdy method. See Simon, supra note
2, at 513.
" See notes 36-64 and accompanying text infra. Compare Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S.
Navigator, 407 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1968) (toggle press weighing 3 tons bolted to a skid
considered a package), with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) (electrical transformer weighing 18 1/2 tons bolted
to wooden skid not a package).
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ing views as to the legislative intent of COGSA, the commercial
practicability of the legal tests being applied, and the importance
of the intention of the parties. Thus, to determine why these courts
have arrived at such divergent results, it is necessary to discuss the
purpose of COGSA and the precontainer definition of the word
package.
The Purpose of COGSA
It has been widely acknowledged that COGSA was not intended
to relieve a carrier of its normal responsibility for just claims."
Indeed, the Act nullifies any clause in a contract which purports to
reduce the liability of a carrier or a ship below the $500 per package
minimum.3 This rule reflects "a commonsense recognition of the
inequality in bargaining power" between carriers and shipping in-
terests and helps "to prevent the impairment of the value and nego-
tiability of the ocean bill of lading."32 In short, COGSA apparently
was enacted as a compromise between shipper and carrier inter-
ests.13 Its major objective is to protect carriers from excessive
claims,34 while discouraging negligence or indifference on the part
of carriers by establishing an irreducible minimum liability of $500
"' See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Stirnimann v. The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1945).
31 Section 3(8) of COGSA, 46 U.S.C, § 1303(8) (1970), states in pertinent part:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in 'a contract of carriage relieving the carrier
or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods,
arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in
this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter,
shall be null and void and of no effect ....
This language is quite similar to that employed in the Harter Act. See note 15 supra. The
Harter Act, however, is silent with respect to package limitation clauses and thus allows
carriers to limit liability in bills of lading to as little as $10 per package. See Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960, 962 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974); Simon, supra note 2, at 518. The Hague Rules and COGSA closed this loophole
by the addition of a monetary per package limitation. See notes 1 & 19 supra. It should be
noted that the maximum per package liability under COGSA may be increased by agreement
of the parties. See 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970).
32 GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 147.
3 According to one authority, the key element of COGSA is the balance it strikes be-
tween the responsibilities and liabilities of the carrier and the rights and immunities under
which the carrier can avoid liability. Id. at 149-50; see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far
E. Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960, 962 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969); van Wageningen,
supra note 3, at 175.
31 Caterpillar Americas Co. v. S.S. Sea Roads, 231 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1964), aff'd
per curiam, 364 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Nichimen Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d
319, 335 (2d Cir. 1972) (one purpose of COGSA is to protect carriers from liability for small
packages of great value).
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per package. 5 Unfortunately, due to the recent inflationary spiral,
this dollar limitation has become quite unrealistic.
Precontainer Decisions Defining Package
In the early decision of Gulf Italia Co. v. The Exiria,3' a judge
within the Southern District of New York accepted the layman's
interpretation of the word package and held that a 43,319 pound
tractor which had been "prepared for shipment by putting water-
proof papering about some of the more vital parts . . . [and par-
tially covering its] superstructure with wooden plankings" 3 was not
a package within the meaning of COGSA.35 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed, 39 concluding that the method of preparing cargo
for shipment does not "[convert] the goods into a 'package.' -40 The
court stated that a contrary holding would place a shipper who
attempts to protect his cargo in a far "worse position than a ship-
per who makes no effort to reduce the possibility of loss from incle-
ment weather or pilfering."4' In Mitsubishi International Corp. v.
S.S. Palmetto State,4" however, the Second Circuit determined
that the $500 limitation was applicable to three large fully enclosed
5 See note 2 supra.
" 160 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
3' 160 F. Supp. at 957.
31 Id. at 959. The Gulf Italia court discussed Middle E. Agency, Inc. v. The John B.
Waterman, 86 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), which determined that tractors shipped without
any shipping preparation were not COGSA packages, but a rock crusher subject to minimal
shipping preparations was a package. In distinguishing Waterman, the court pointed out that
the rock crusher involved therein had been prepared to facilitate handling while the tractor
in the present case was enclosed only for protection. 160 F. Supp. at 959.
11 263 F.2d at 137. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Moore refused to construe the word
package in accordance with its common meaning. Emphasizing that the tractor appeared
carefully packaged and that it was described as a package in the bill of lading, the Judge
concluded that the tractor should be deemed a package. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
11 Id. See also Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1953) (locomo-
tive not a package); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co.,
155 F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 761 (1946) (13 pieces of steel shackled to
the deck of a ship not packages); Stirnimann v. The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir.
1945) ("crane was hardly to be regarded as shipped in packages"); Middle E. Agency, Inc. v.
The John B. Waterman, 86 F. Supp. 487, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (word package printed on
a bill of lading not a stipulation that tractors were packages but disassembled and crated
parts of a rock crusher were packaged). But see The Margaret Lykes, 57 F. Supp. 466, 471
(E.D. La. 1944) (description on bill of lading constituted a stipulation that items, including
a truck, were packages).
" 263 F.2d at 137. Both the district court and the court of appeals reasoned that poor
commercial practices would be fostered if shippers were penalized for protecting their goods.
42 311 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963).
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rolls of steel. 3 Noting that "the field of admiralty law is not an area
in which the layman should venture to tread,"" the court indicated
that any article completely enclosed in a box, regardless of size and
weight, is a package within the scope of section 4(5) .1
Seven years after Gulf Italia, a divided Second Circuit panel,
in Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampf-
schifffahrts-Gesellschaft," held that pallets containing 60-pound
cardboard boxes filled with television tuners were packages under
COGSA.4 7 In so ruling, the court observed that the parties had char-
acterized the pallets as packages in various documents, including
the bill of lading, and that the shipper himself had palletized the
cargo "for the reasons of greater convenience and safety in han-
dling."4 The Second Circuit concluded that any other definition of
package would lack predictability and force the carrier to look be-
yond the bill of lading and outer packaging in determining the con-
tents of a shipment for insurance coverage purposes."
11 311 F.2d at 384. In Mitsubishi, the carrier's liability was limited to $500 per roll
notwithstanding the fact that the actual amount of loss was $31,000. Id. at 382-83. The court
was not swayed by plaintiff's argument that the purpose of COGSA is to prevent excessive
claims on small packages, rather than to insulate carriers from liability for fair claims. In
support of its position the court noted that a shipper wishing to avoid the $500 limitation
need only state the actual cargo value in the bill of lading and pay for greater coverage. Id.
at 384-85. But see Stirnimann v. The San Diego, 148 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1945) (COGSA
was intended to achieve these two objectives).
311 F.2d at 383.
Id. at 384. Cf. Lucchese v. Malabe Shipping Co., 351 F. Supp. 588 (D.P.R. 1972)
(trailer fully enclosing household goods was a package because freight was computed on a flat
rate and bill of lading referred to it as a single unit); John Deere & Co. v. Mississippi Shipping
Co., 170 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. La. 1959) (since shipper had not declared the value of a fully
boxed tractor, liability was limited to $500). See generally Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill
Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (1959), wherein the Court, in holding that COGSA does not limit
the negligence liability of a stevedore, assumed that a fully encased 19-ton press was a
package. Id. at 307-08. But see Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) (court rejected definition of package dependent
upon the "extent of external covering" as provocative of litigation). 263 F.2d at 138.
" 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
375 F.2d at 944.
" Id. at 946.
, Id. at 947. The court rejected the libellant's contentions that the pallet should be
disregarded because it is merely a loading device. Id. at 945-46. In so ruling, the court
considered the parties' characterization of the cargo embodied in the dock receipt, bill of
lading, and claim letter to be of great importance. Id. at 946. The court also was influenced
by the fact that the shipper could have avoided the limitation by declaring the true value of
the goods. Id.
The majority opinion has been harshly criticized. One commentator is of the opinion that
the court failed to implement the remedial intent of the legislature, and was "unjustified in
relying on the carrier's bill of lading terms in applying the statute." Simon, Containers-Are
They a "Package"?, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 441, 444 (1973). Other authors have asserted that
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Feinberg asserted that the ma-
jority decision ignored the policies underlying section 4(5). 0 He
noted the Second Circuit in the past had indicated that an article
would not be considered a package unless it "completely
enclose[d] the goods in question." 5' Therefore, Judge Feinberg
urged, each carton should be deemed a package under the statute."
While conceding that the majority's decision might result in a more
predictable definition of the term package, the dissent nevertheless
suggested that "certainty at the expense of legislative policy and
equity is undesirable and often turns out to be ephemeral. 5 3
Departing further from the "fully enclosed" requirement, the
Second Circuit, in Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator,54 de-
cided that an unboxed 6200-pound press bolted to a skid 5 was a
package. 6 The court emphasized that the skid was used primarily
by the shipper to facilitate the transportation of the press, even
the decision does not promote predictability but instead creates additional confusion. See
Bissell, supra note 27, at 910.
' 375 F.2d at 947 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). One of the policies behind § 4(5) is to protect
cargo interests from severe liability disclaimers. See text accompanying notes 2 & 35 supra.
Accordingly, Judge Feinberg reasoned that a close case should be resolved in the shipper's
favor. 375 F.2d at 947. This suggestion has been praised by at least one commentator. See
Bissell, supra note 27, at 909.
11 375 F.2d at 947 (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (citing Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v. S.S. Pal-
metto State, 311 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963)). At the time,
there seemed to be conflicting opinions in the Second Circuit regarding whether an item must
completely enclose the goods in order to be considered a package. Compare Mitsubishi Int'l
Corp. v. S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922
(1963) ("We think that an article completely enclosed in a wooden box prepared for shipment
is a 'package' . . . ."), with Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135,
137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) ("Any test [for a package) dependent upon
extent of external covering would lead to uncertainty and increase litigation.").
52 375 F.2d at 947-48 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 948 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). It has been stated that the majority opinion does
not foster predictability. See note 49 supra.
'4 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 277 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (mem.).
The skid, a low wooden platform used to facilitate handling and storage of merchan-
dise, was made from two 130-inch pieces of lumber which were perpendicular to and bolted
to three 96-inch pieces of lumber. 407 F.2d at 153.
"' This package was 11 feet high, measured 55 by 46 inches at the base and 98 by 67
inches at the top. It was affixed to a wooden skid approximately twice the area of its base.
Id. The court stated that the word package embraces any cargo which has been prepared in
such a manner as to ease its handling during shipment, regardless of whether it is completely
or partially enclosed. Id. at 155. A possibly irreconcilable opinion was expressed in Gulf Italia
Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902
(1959), where a partially enclosed but unskidded tractor was held not to be a package. The
Gulf Italia court expressly rejected appellant's argument that the preparation of cargo for
shipment may transform it into a COGSA package. 263 F.2d at 137. It is interesting to note
that Judge Moore, who authored a vigorous dissent in Gulf Italia, wrote the majority opinion
in Aluminios.
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though it did to some extent protect the machinery from damage. 7
Additionally, the Second Circuit panel noted that the parties had
described the press as a package in the bill of lading. 8 In conclud-
ing, the court tacitly overruled its prior decisions," stating:
The meaning of "package" which has evolved from the cases
can therefore be said to define a class of cargo, irrespective of size,
shape or weight, to which some packaging preparation for trans-
portation has been made which facilitates handling, but which
does not necessarily conceal or completely enclose the goods.6"
The foregoing is true even though the partial packaging serves a
purpose in addition to facilitating transportation.
As can be gleaned from these decisions, the Second Circuit has
slowly departed from its initial practice of construing the word
package in accordance with the term's common meaning. Presently,
in determining liability for damage or loss to noncontainerized
cargo, the court considers such factors as the intent of the parties
as evidenced by the bill of lading, and the shipper's interest in the
method of transporting the cargo.
In contrast to the decisions of the Second Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Pacific Far East Lines,
Inc.,"1 held that a 36,700-pound unboxed electrical transformer at-
tached by bolts to a wooden skid was not a package.2 The court
'7 407 F.2d at 155.
" Id. at 153.
5' See notes 51 & 56 supra.
o 407 F.2d at 155 (emphasis added). In Companhia Hidro Electrica v. S/S "Loide Hon-
duras," 368 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the district court found that the language in the
Aluminios opinion established the standard applicable to partially-packaged cargo. The
packages involved in Companhia were 239 1/3-cubic-foot circuit breakers, each mounted on
a steel base and partially protected by wooden crating. The parties disputed whether the
metal base of each circuit breaker was a skid or a permanent part of the instrument. Id. at
290-91. In holding that each circuit breaker constituted a package for the purposes of § 4(5),
the court did not resolve this dispute, but instead stated that the parties were bound by the
description in the bill of lading. Id. at 291. Disagreeing with the reasoning of Gulf Italia Co.
v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959), that
a distinction exists between packaging that protects cargo and packaging that facilitates
handling, the court found that "[plackaging, to the extent that it protects the cargo, also
facilitates its handling." 368 F. Supp. at 291. See General Motors Corp. v. S.S. Mormacoak,
327 F. Supp. 666, 668 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 451 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), where the court, employing the Aluminios
standard, held that a generator which was not on skids and which had no preparation de-
signed to facilitate shipment was not a COGSA package.
51 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
12 491 F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 320 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The district
court found no distinction between the skidded toggle press in Aluminios and the skidded
transformer in Hartford; consequently, it held that the electrical transformer was a package
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reasoned that if Congress had intended palletized cargo to be con-
sidered a package, it would have expressly so stated. 3 Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the facilitation-of-transport test utilized
by the Second Circuit and concluded that the term package should
be interpreted with reference to its common meaning. 4
Thus, both the Second and Ninth Circuits apparently would
agree that an item completely enclosed in a box or carton is a pack-
age under COGSA. The Second Circuit goes beyond this, however,
and includes within its definition of package, goods partially en-
closed or placed on skids or pallets by the shipper to facilitate trans-
portation. As might be expected, these principles have had a signifi-
cant effect upon courts confronted with the difficult problem
whether a container is a package within the meaning of COGSA.
CONTAINER CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE FUNCTIONAL ECONOMICS
TEST
Although it was presented with an opportunity to consider the
container problem in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong
Kong Producer,6 5 the Second Circuit was able to bypass the question
because it found an unreasonable deviation from the terms of the
for the purposes of § 4(5). 320 F. Supp. at 325. On appeal, however, the shipper urged that a
distinction did exist in that the skids in Aluminios were attached to the toggle press to
facilitate handling while the transformer in Hartford could be moved on its own as it had
metal lugs attached to its corners. The Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to rely on this
distinction; instead, the court rejected the facilitation-of-transport test as being without
merit and reversed the district court decision. 491 F.2d at 965.
491 F.2d at 963. See generally Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800
(2d Cir. 1971); Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
11 491 F.2d at 963-65. The common-meaning test also was applied in Omark Indus., Inc.
v. Associated Container Transp. (Austl.), Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 139 (D. Ore. 1976), where the
court explained that
Congress, from all that can be gathered from the statute and its legislative history,
never intended the word "package" to be treated as a sophisticated or esoteric term
of art. Giving due recognition to this fact, the analytical framework within which
the instant case must be decided becomes clear and uncomplicated. This Court's
task, simply stated, is to determine whether the palletized unit or the cartons
contained therein best comports with the "plain, ordinary meaning" of the word
"package."
Id. at 141-42. Nevertheless, the Omark court held that a palletized bundle rather than its
component cartons was a "package." Id. at 142. The bundle was a rectangular mass enclosed
by heavy corrogated cardboard on three sides and thin cardboard employed as a buffer
between the pallet and the bundle on the fourth side. The underside of the cargo was well
protected by the pallet board itself. The court concluded that "the heavy cardboard outer
shell served to consolidate, protect and restrain the smaller, thinner cartons and their con-
tents-thus creating a concededly compound but nonetheless bona fide 'package.'" Id.
1 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
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bill of lading by the carrier which destroyed the $500 package limi-
tation.6 Judge Hays dissented and argued that the deviation was
too insignificant to deprive the carrier of the benefits of section
4(5).67 Relying upon the Second Circuit's earlier decision in
Standard Electrica, he contended that the $500 per package limita-
tion applied to each of the containers.18 In support of this conclu-
sion, Judge Hays observed that the bill of lading characterized the
containers as packages and the shipper had delivered the sealed
containers to the carrier. Therefore, it was his view that the "parties
intended [that] each individual container . . . be considered as the
functional packing unit" for the purposes of the $500 per package
limitation.69 Judge Hays' language probably was the genesis of the
"functional economics test," a standard later adopted and now
employed by the Second Circuit in container cases.7"
66 The shipper in Britannica had loaded 4080 cartons of books in eight separate metal
containers which were delivered to the S.S. Hong Kong Producer for shipment to Japan. A
short form bill of lading was issued which incorporated by reference a provision in the carrier's
regular form bill of lading. In essence, the incorporated clause stated that under-deck stowage
would not be required unless the shipper requested it in writing. Pursuant to this provision,
six of the containers were stowed on the weather deck. As a result, 13 hundred cartons were
damaged by sea water en route. 422 F.2d at 9-10. In holding that the shipper could properly
have assumed it was receiving a clean bill of lading requiring below-deck stowage, id. at 18,
the court emphasized that the provision in this carrier's bill of lading, of which the shipper
had no actual knowledge, was "a new and ingenious device" to lessen the carrier's liability
in violation of the clear intent and purpose of COGSA. Id. at 12-13. Since on-deck stowage
was an unreasonable deviation from the terms of a clean bill of lading, the court held, the
carrier was liable for the full amount of the damage without the benefit of COGSA's $500
per package limitation. Id. at 18.
61 Id. at 20 (Hays, J., dissenting).
Id. In holding that nine pallets, each of which contained six cartons of television
tuners, were packages, the court in Standard Electrica had emphasized the intent of the
parties as evidenced by the descriptions in the documents and the fact that the shipper had
chosen to use pallets to facilitate transportation. 375 F.2d at 946. Judge Hays believed that
a similar situation existed in Encyclopaedia Britannica as the shipper had delivered packed
containers to the carrier and listed the number and description of packages on the bill of
lading. 422 F.2d at 20.
69 422 F.2d at 20 (Hays, J., dissenting). Judge Hays did not explain his concept of a
functional packing unit. It is suggested that he did not intend to create a new test, but was
simply following the facilitation-of-transport test laid down in Standard Electrica. See Truck
Ins. Exch. v. American Export Freight, Inc., 1972 A.M.C. 2509 (N.D. Ill. 1972) wherein the
court, citing Standard Electrica, held that a container was a package where it had been
loaded, sealed and delivered to the carrier by the shipper and the bill of lading referred to
the number of packages as one container. Id. at 2509-10. See also Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Nordeutscher Lloyd, 1973 A.M.C. 1392, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (container held to be pack-
age where bill of lading stated number of packages as "1 container" and the shipper had pro-
cured and loaded the container without any involvement of the carrier). See generally De-
Orchis, supra note 3, at 256; van Wageningen, supra note 3, at 180-81.
" See notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra.
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The court did not, however, immediately adopt Judge Hays'
reasoning. In Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 71 a container
owned by the carrier was delivered to a German shipper, at the
shipper's request, for loading. The shipper's employees stowed
ninety-nine bales of leather into the container and sealed it in the
presence of the carrier's agent.72 Although the cargo had been deliv-
ered to port undamaged, the sealed container was stolen from the
carrier's terminal. The container later was located, but the contents
were gone.7 3 The Second Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge
Friendly, held that the container was not a package under section
4(5). Attempting to distinguish the court's earlier decision in
Standard Electrica, which held that pallets containing cardboard
boxes were packages, Judge Friendly stated that "[t]he pallets [in
Standard Electrica] were nothing like the size of the container here;
they had been made up by the shipper; and the 'dock receipt, the
bill of lading, and libellant's claim letter all indicated that the
parties regarded each pallet as a package.' -71 In the present case,
the carrier was on notice as to exactly how many cartons had been
loaded into the container. 75 Judge Friendly left for future considera-
tion the question whether a different result would be reached if the
shipper "had packed the bales in a container already on its premises
and the bill of lading had given no information with respect to the
number of bales. '76
Confronted with this precise situation in Royal Typewriter Co.
v. M/V Kulmerland,71 the Second Circuit fashioned the functional
economics test78 and held that a container stowing 350 adding ma-
71 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
11 Leather's Best, Inc. had purchased 11 tons of leather from a seller located in Wein-
heim, Germany. The seller requested that a container be delivered to its plant and the carrier
engaged a truckman to perform this task. The truckman, deemed an agent of the carrier by
the court, watched as the leather was loaded into the container and then delivered the sealed
container to the vessel. Id. at 804.
7' Id. at 806.
7' Id. at 815 (quoting Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampf-
schifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967)). The
court reasoned that the purpose of COGSA, which is "to set a reasonable figure below which
the carrier should not be permitted to limit his liability," would be thwarted if a large metal
container which is functionally a part of the ship is considered a package for purposes of the
$500 liability. 451 F.2d at 815.
7 See note 72 and accompanying text supro.
" 451 F.2d at 815.
77 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
11 Id. at 648. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra. A number of cases have since
employed the functional economics test. See, e.g., Baby Togs, Inc. v. S.S. American Ming,
1975 A.M.C. 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (individual cartons of clothing stored within containers
1977]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
chines packed in cartons is a COGSA package.79 Apparently, the
Kulmerland court relied upon Judge Hays' concept of the functional
packing unit in creating the functional economics test.8 0 The avowed
purpose of this test is to ensure predictability by permitting the
"parties concerned [to] allocate responsibility for loss at the time
of contract, purchase additional insurance if necessary, and thus
'avoid the pains of litigation.' "181 Therefore, it has been labeled a
"common sense" approach.8 2 Explaining the mechanics of the func-
tional economics test, the Kulmerland court pointed out that the
critical factor is "whether the contents of the container could have
feasibly been shipped overseas in the individual packages or cartons
in which they were packed by the shipper.""3 If so, a presumption
is created that the container is not a package. To rebut this pre-
sumption, the carrier must come forward with evidence establishing
the parties' intention to treat the container as a package. 4 In the
event that the shipper's packaging is determined to be inadequate
for overseas shipment, a presumption arises that the container is a
package. The shipper has the burden of overcoming this presump-
held to be a package); Eastman Kodak Co. v. S/S Transmariner, 1975 A.M.C. 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (container holding photographic supplies and chemicals held to be a package); Insur-
ance Co. of N. America v. S/S Brooklyn Maru, Japan Line, Ltd., 1974 A.M.C. 2443 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (container consisting of 636 boxes constitutes a package).
" 483 F.2d at 649.
In formulating the functional economics test, the Kulmerland court referred to Judge
Hays' use of the words functional packing unit in his Encyclopaedia Britannica dissent. Id.
at 648 n.9. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra. The Kulmerland court went on to
state that the new test is not inconsistent with its earlier decisions under the facilitation-of-
transport test. Id. For a discussion of the facilitation-of-transport test, see notes 46-60 and
accompanying text supra.
1, 483 F.2d at 649 (quoting Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische
Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967)).
According to one authority, the Kulmerland court overlooked the fact that the carrier has no
way of knowing how the goods inside a sealed container are packed, which knowledge is
crucial if the carrier is to predict whether and to what extent it will be held liable for cargo
damage or loss. See DeOrchis, supra note 3, at 257.
" 483 F.2d at 649.
Id. at 648.
" Id. at 649. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. S/S Transmariner, 1975 A.M.C. 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). There, the shipper loaded the container at its premises with cases suitable for indepen-
dent shipment. A presumption therefore arose that the cases were packages under COGSA.
The carrier was able to rebut this presumption, however, by showing that the cases were taken
out of inventory without any further preparation for shipping and that it had no notice as to
the contents of the container. Id. at 127-28. In Baby Togs, Inc. v. S.S. American Ming, 1975
A.M.C. 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the shipper established that the containerized cartons could
have been independently shipped. Accordingly, each carton was presumed to be a COGSA
package. The carrier was unable to rebut this presumption since the bill of lading enumerated
the container's contents and the freight rate was not figured per container. Id. at 2021.
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tion by demonstrating the parties did not intend that the container
be a package.,5 Thus, factors such as trade custom and usage, char-
acterization of the cargo by the parties in the documentation or
other papers, and other considerations touching upon the parties'
intent are relevant only for purposes of rebutting the initial pre-
sumption that arises. 6
Turning to the facts before it, the Kulmerland court observed
that the plaintiff had ordered adding machines from a German
manufacturer, who delivered them to an international freight for-
warder. Pursuant to the shipper's directions, the freight forwarder,
who was the manufacturer's agent, loaded the individually crated
machines into containers at its West Berlin warehouse. 7 Thereafter,
the containers were shipped by rail to the port of Hamburg where
they were delivered to the carrier. The carrier issued a clean ocean
bill of lading, which acknowledged receipt of the containers without
making reference to the number of cartons. 8 The machinery had
been packed in single-wall corrugated cartons measuring 15" x 10"
x 10" and sealed with paper tape. Prior to containerization, similar
machinery had been shipped in large wooden crates or cases. 9
Therefore, the court reasoned, in the absence of containerization the
machinery could not have been shipped overseas in the corrugated
1 483 F.2d at 649. One commentator has argued that instead of reducing the "pains of
litigation," see text accompanying note 81 supra, the procedure for rebutting the initial
presumption may lead to lengthy interrogatories and depositions. See DeOrchis, supra note
3, at 258.
" 483 F.2d at 649. Courts consider the information contained in dock receipts, bills of
lading, and other documents indicative of the parties' intent. See, e.g., Standard Electrica,
S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 946 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967). Thus, if a bill of lading lists the number of packages
as "1 container" this tends to establish that the parties intended the container to be the
package. This viewpoint overlooks the nature of a bill of lading, however, which is drawn up
by the carrier, often in such a way that the shipper has very little leeway with respect to the
information contained in it. Cf. Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cir.
1974) (bill holder cannot escape contractual limitation simply by claiming that bill of lading
is adhesion contract).
Another factor considered by courts to be important in determining the parties' intent
is whether it was the shipper or carrier who chose to use the container. See, e.g., Rosenbruch
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 1976 A.M.C. 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1976); Standard
Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sundamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d
943, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
Finally, whether an agent or employee of the carrier observed the loading of the container
and thereby ascertained the number of cartons placed in it has been considered important
by courts in determining the parties' intent. See, e.g., Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion,
514 F.2d 1291, 1299 (2d Cir. 1974).
" 483 F.2d at 646.
A Id.
x9 ITd
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cartons.' " Consequently, pursuant to the functional economics test,
a presumption arose that the containers were packages for the pur-
poses of section 4(5). The Second Circuit found that the shipper had
failed to introduce evidence sufficient "to show why the container
should not be treated as the 'package.' ",'
Recently, in Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion,2 the Sec-
ond Circuit was presented with another opportunity to apply the
functional economics test. There, a quantity of canned hams packed
in corrugated cartons, some of which were strapped on pallets, was
shipped in a container from Denmark to New York. 3 The container,
which was owned by the carrier, was loaded by the shipper at the
shipper's place of business. An agent of the carrier was present at
the tally and count, and may have participated in it. Prior to deliv-
ery in New York the cargo was stolen. 4
At the outset, the Cameco court determined that the container
was presumed not to be a package since cans of ham had customar-
ily been shipped in corrugated cartons before the advent of contai-
nerization. 5 Hence, the burden of proof rested on the carrier to show
that the parties intended to treat the container as a package. Not-
ing various factors which indicated that a container was used for the
mutual benefit of the parties,97 the court held that the carrier had
not met this burden; therefore, the $500 per package limitation did
not apply to the container as a unit. By way of dicta, the Second
Circuit stated that if the carrier had not been present at the con-
tainer loading and had not otherwise obtained "information as to
what [was] inside the container . . .he might then [have been]
able to overcome the burden of proof imposed upon him."99
Another case recently decided by the Second Circuit,
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 1292.
Id. Due to a mix-up, no arrangements had been made to pick up the container in New
York. The container remained on the pier for several days during which time it was stolen.
Id. at 1294.
U Id. at 1294, 1299.
Id. at 1299.
9, The court noted that since the ship itself contained no internal refrigeration, the goods
could not have been shipped on it without the refrigerated container. In addition, the ship-
per received a 10% discount for using the container. Id.
" Id. Other factors which persuaded the court that the carrier had not rebutted the
initial presumption were the presence of the carrier's agent during loading and the enumera-
tion of the number of cartons in the bill of lading. Id. at 1299-1300.
U Id. at 1300.
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Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc.,'"' pur-
ported to answer the question left open in Leather's Best, viz.
whether a container loaded by the shipper on his premises is a
package when the bill of lading does not indicate the number of
units in it.' 0' In Rosenbruch, the plaintiff shipper contracted with
an international freight forwarder for the shipment of his household
goods from Norwood, New Jersey to Hamburg, Germany."2 The
freight forwarder prepared the bill of lading, packed the goods for
the shipper, and obtained a container, without charge, from the
carrier. At Norwood, New Jersey, the container was stuffed and
sealed, and then redelivered to the carrier in Staten Island. The bill
of lading stated that one package was being shipped and described
the contents as "'used household goods,'"103 Due to inclement
weather, the entire shipment was lost at sea.' °4
Faced with a situation in which the container was loaded at the
shipper's premises and the bill of lading was silent as to the number
of units shipped, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the applicability of
the functional economics test and held that the container was a
package under COGSA. °5 In so holding, the court placed particular
emphasis on the carrier's lack of involvement in the loading of the
container and its unawareness as to the number of units within the
container.' 0 Finding that the household goods could not have been
shipped in their present packaging absent a container and that the
carrier had not participated in the loading of the container or the
preparation of the bill of lading, the court concluded that the con-
tainer should be deemed a package under the functional economics
test. 107
1976 A.M.C. 487 (2d Cir. 1976).
,o, See text accompanying note 76 supra.
' 1976 A.M.C. at 489.
'13Id. at 491.
" The container loaded with plaintiff's goods, as well as 31 other containers, was stowed
on the weather deck and consequently lost at sea. Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
' Id. The fact that the carrier or its agent was in a position to know the actual number
of cartons or items loaded in a container frequently has been an important consideration in
finding that such items are packages. See, e.g., Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514
F.2d 1291, 1297, 1299 (2d Cir. 1974).
"1 1976 A.M.C. at 492. Interestingly, in applying the functional economics test the court
did not treat the test as creating a presumption that the container was or was not a package
which may be rebutted by other evidence of the parties' actual intent. Rather, the court
appears to have interpreted the test as giving the shipper a choice in advance of shipment;
the shipper may either package the items so as to be suitable for shipment without containers
and have the $500 limitation applied to each carton, or it may use containers, receive the
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not yet had the
opportunity to address the container issue. In fact, Matsushita Elec-
tric Corp. of America v. S.S. Aegis Spirit'°8 is the only decision
within the circuit involving this question. The Matsushita court,
relying upon earlier Ninth Circuit authority, applied the common-
meaning standard and concluded that a container is not a package
within the ambit of section 4(5).109 To highlight the disparate ap-
proaches utilized by the Second Circuit and the Matsushita district
court in resolving the container issue, the significant aspects of the
Matsushita decision will be discussed.
In Matsushita, electrical equipment slated for exportation to
the United States had been wrapped in plastic bags, fitted with
styrofoam padding, and packed in durable cardboard cartons."'
These cartons were then stuffed into containers belonging to the
carrier by the shipper's employees at the shipper's place of busi-
ness.'"1 Accordingly, the court found that the carrier did not possess
first hand knowledge of the quality and quantity of the contents of
the containers."12 It is important to note, however, that the bills of
lading did indicate the number of cartons said to be packed within
each container."11-
Judge Beeks, pointing out that this was a case of first impres-
sion within the Ninth Circuit, began his analysis by examining the
Second Circuit cases dealing with containerization. Observing that
these decisions "have not been altogether congruous in approach
and result,""' he detected two discernible trends in the Second
Circuit's treatment of the problem. In the earlier decisions, Judge
Beeks ascertained a clear indication by the Second Circuit that a
10% rate reduction allowed for containerized goods, and submit to the $500 per container
limitation. Id. at 491-92.
,' 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
, Id. at 907. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
"° 414 F.Supp. at 899.
' Id. Under the usual carriage contract, it is the responsibility of the shipper to load
the containers. This is advantageous to the shipper because he has control over the handling
of his goods and can insure a tight stow. Id. at 901.
,,2 Id. at 899.
,, Id. at 898. The various bills of lading showed the number of containers or packages
as "'2" containers, but under the "Description of Goods" heading listed the number of individ-
ual cartons, the gross weight, and the measurement. The freight rate was calculated per
container, and the bills of lading contained a clause incorporating an express agreement to
treat each container as a package or unit. However, the carrier also issued a "letter of
guaranty" stating that its liability for loss or damage was limited to $500 for each package in
the containers. Id. The court decided the package limitation issue without reference to this
letter, indicating in dictum that it might be invalid. Id. at 905.
,"4 Id. at 902.
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carrier-owned container would not be considered a package under
COGSA. '1 5 According to Judge Beeks, these cases emphasized that
the term package as used in section 4(5) refers to the method in
which a shipper packs his cargo and not to a metal container which
is a " '[functional] part of the ship.'"
The Matsushita court found that a vastly different approach
was taken by the Second Circuit in the later cases, where the func-
tional economics test was applied.11 7 By employing this test, the
Second Circuit adopted a judicially neutral position, since it made
the determination whether the container is to be viewed as a pack-
age contingent upon the type of packaging employed by the shipper.
Ultimately, however, the intent of the parties is controlling under
the test because it may be introduced to rebut the initial presump-
tion that arises from the type of packaging used. Judge Beeks criti-
cized the functional economics test as "contrary to the statute, com-
mercially impracticable and unwise.""' In his opinion, to be satis-
factory a test "must reflect the realities of the maritime industry of
today while remaining faithful to the express language and legisla-
tive policy embodied in the pertinent COGSA provisions.""' It was
Judge Beeks' belief that the functional economics test failed to meet
these criteria. He was unable to detect anything in the statute which
justified a presumption based upon whether the packaging em-
I's Id. Judge Beeks cited both Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d
Cir. 1971) and Shinko Boeki Co. v. S.S. "Pioneer Moon," 507 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1974) for the
proposition that a container should never be considered a package. Shinko Boeki involved
the shipment of liquid latex in 2000-gallon movable containers which were stowed on deck.
In holding that the containers were not packages, the court analogized them to a ship's deep
tanks which, as functional parts of the ship, clearly would not have been considered packages.
Id. at 345. The Shinko Boeki court, however, distinguished bulk shipment of liquids from
packaged goods shipped in containers and stated that the functional economics test was not
applicable to the former. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the same purpose underlies
the use of containers for packaged and nonpackaged cargo, i.e., efficiency and economy, and
therefore, the same legal principles ought to apply to both. According to this view, the
carrier's equipment, whether it is used for stowing packaged cargo or nonpackaged bulk cargo
such as crude oil, grain, or automobiles, would never be considered a COGSA package. See
Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. &. Com. 603 (1975).
"1 414 F. Supp. at 902.
117 Id.
'1 Id. at 906. Judge Beeks regarded the functional economics test as contrary to both
the language of COGSA section 4(5) which makes no distinction between packaging that falls
above or below a certain standard of strength or durability, and the policy of that section
which is to establish a minimum level below which a carrier can not limit its liability. Id. at
904. Further, Judge Beeks believed that by penalizing shippers who employ the economical
packaging made possible by containerization, the test serves as a disincentive to "mercantile
economization." Id. See note 122 and accompanying text infra.
"1 414 F. Supp. at 903-04.
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ployed is functional. Section 4(5) distinguishes between cargo
shipped in packages and cargo not so shipped, but does not differen-
tiate goods transported in cartons from those shipped in cases or
other receptacles."" Additionally, since the test requires a determi-
nation as to whether the packaging used was suitable for a hypothet-
ical overseas shipment, Judge Beeks asserted, it compels courts to
make conjectural determinations and consider evidence not even
remotely contemplated by the framers of section 4(5).121 Further, the
test penalized shippers who take advantage of the more economical
packaging methods available when containers are employed be-
cause, in the event of loss or damage, they will have the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the container is a COGSA pack-
age.'22 In this regard, the court opined, the test fosters economic
waste since it forces shippers to employ sturdier packaging than
would otherwise be necessary in order to avoid giving rise to an
unfavorable presumption.1'2
Interestingly, Judge Beeks considered the most serious flaw of
the test to be its dependence upon the intent of the parties. He
believed that the package limitation becomes totally illusory when
"the courts' function in applying it is to merely identify and uphold
the parties' private definition of [a] COGSA package."'2 4 The
Matsushita court went on to state that "[t]he better and more
traditional approach . . . is to conscientiously construe the legisla-
tion in the factual context seeking to effectuate the legislative, not
the parties', intent and purpose.' 21 5
Having rejected the functional economics test, Judge Beeks was
faced with the task of formulating a suitable alternative. Accord-
ingly, he turned to the Second Circuit's decision in Leather's Best,
Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx2 6 for guidance and found that containers
are more analogous to "detached stowage compartments of the
ship" which serve to divide up the available cargo stowage space
than they are to COGSA packages.' 27 Consequently, the court con-
,' See note 118 supra.
121 414 F. Supp. at 904. Presumably, courts would have to consider lengthy testimony
concerning customary packaging methods prior to containerization, or rely on expert testi-
mony to determine whether a particular mode of packaging could withstand a voyage absent
the container.
"' Id. See Simon, supra note 2, at 522-24.
"= 414 F. Supp. at 906.
1 Id. at 905.
:25 Id. at 904 (emphasis in original).
2, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971), discussed at notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
'= 414 F.2d at 907. See Shinko Boeki Co., Ltd. v. S.S. "Pioneer Moon," 507 F.2d 342,
345 (2d Cir. 1974); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 815 (2d Cir. 1971).
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cluded that the $500 package limitation is not applicable to a con-
tainer as a single unit. A contrary holding, in Judge Beeks' view,
would distort the meaning of the statutory term package.
In the course of his discussion, Judge Beeks dismissed the argu-
ment that it is unfair to base a carrier's liability upon the number
of packages inside a container since the carrier often does not pos-
sess such information. To rectify this situation, the judge suggested,
carriers could require that this data be included in the bill of lading
as a precondition to shipment.12 He observed that "[c]arriers are
hardly helpless to secure [such] information and will not be heard
to argue their self-imposed ignorance as a countervailing considera-
tion."" 9
Before an attempt is made to formulate a solution to the con-
tainer problem, it should prove interesting to consider how
Matsushita -would have been resolved by the Second Circuit. Quite
possibly, in deciding the case, that court would have applied the
functional economics test. 3 ' Under this test, a rebuttable presump-
tion arises that a container is or is not a COGSA package based
upon whether the shipper's own cartons or units are considered
functional. 3 ' In determining whether to override the initial pre-
sumption, the court looks to the intent of the parties as manifested
by, inter alia, their characterization of the container in the docu-
mentation accompanying the transaction. 13 2
Pursuant to these principles, the containers in the Matsushita
case apparently would be deemed COGSA packages. These contain-
ers had been loaded with packages suitable for independent ship-
ment.'33 Accordingly, under the functional economics test, it would
be presumed that each individual carton was a COGSA package.
Cf. Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 603, 604 (1975),
wherein the author quotes part of a speech by a spokesman for a consortium of containerships:
The real meaning of the container revolution is the fact that with the container the
ship was coming to the cargo at the point of origin, wherever it was, however many
miles from the sea . . . for the first time in history.
11 414 F. Supp. at 908. As the drafter of the bill of lading, which is essentially a contract
of adhesion, a carrier can easily ensure that shippers describe the number, nature, and value
of the packages transported in containers. See Simon, supra note 2, at 535.
in 414 F. Supp. at 908.
i See notes 78-99 and accompanying text supra.
"' See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
,3 See Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 1976 A.M.C. 487 (2d Cir.
1976); Cameco v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974); Royal Typewriter Co.
v. MAT Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Norddeutscher Lloyd,
1973 A.M.C. 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Truck Ins. Exch. v. American Export Freight Inc., 1972
A.M.C. 2509 (N.D. Il. 1972); note 86 supra.
1 414 F. Supp. at 900.
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The bill of lading, however, contained an express provision stating
that each container is to be considered a package for liability pur-
poses.'34 Thus, the terms of the bill of lading seemed to evince an
intent on the part of the carrier and shipper to treat each container
as a package. Moreover, since the cargo consisted of fragile electri-
cal equipment, the containerization of it was probably for the bene-
fit of the shipper. Taken together, these factors would appear to
present a sufficient basis for concluding that the initial presumption
had been rebutted. Consequently, the $500 package limitation
would be applied to the containers as single units.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONAL ECONOMICS TEST
Commentators generally have expressed disapproval of the
functional economics test. M. A. DeOrchis has taken the position
that the functional economics test does not afford the parties an
opportunity to allocate responsibility for loss at the time of contract
since the carrier cannot ascertain the manner in which the goods
inside the sealed container are packaged. 3 ' As an alternative, DeOr-
chis recommended a return to the approach employed by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Standard Electrica,3 where it was held that nine
pallets, each containing six cartons of electrical equipment, were
packages under COGSA.' 37 Apparently, the key factors in this deter-
mination were that the shipper had chosen to use pallets to facili-
M See note 113 supra.
'" DeOrchis, supra note 3, at 279. DeOrchis views the limitation of liability area as
essentially an insurance problem. Accordingly, he calls for a rule which would permit the
parties to arrange for adequate insurance coverage at the time of contract. His major criticism
of the functional economics test is that the carrier usually receives containers from the shipper
in a sealed form and therefore has no way of knowing whether the goods inside are packed in
units suitable for shipment. Such knowledge is needed to obtain proper insurance coverage
because the carrier's potential liability is far greater if the units are suitable for shipment
than it would be if the goods were packed in less durable units. Id.
The shipper is in a position to know the manner in which goods are packed and thus can
theoretically predict whether they will be considered COGSA packages under the test. DeOr-
chis nevertheless believes that the shipper also is placed at a disadvantage by the functional
economics test in that the shipper is forced to use expensive and unnecessary packaging to
avoid having the $500 per package limitation applied to the container. Id. at 277-79. If, as
DeOrchis suggests, the problem is merely one of determining allocation of risk for insurance
purposes, the shipper could simply use less expensive packaging and use the savings to
purchase additional insurance. It is important, however, to determine which party should
bear the burden of obtaining the additional insurance. As one authority has stated,
"relegation of an injured property owner to insurance is . . . an abdication of [the] legal
process." Simon, supra note 2, at 534.
'3' DeOrchis, supra note 3, at 258.
'3' 375 F.2d at 946. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
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tate handling and the bill of lading had described the pallets as
packages.'38 Therefore, DeOrchis suggested that the following test
be applied to determine whether a container is a package for the
purpose of the $500 per package limitation:
Where the use of a container is chosen by the shipper. . . and the
bill of lading counts each container as one package, the limitation
should apply to the container. Where the goods are packed in the
container by the carrier. . . and the number of cartons or bales is
tallied by the carrier and receipt of their number is acknowledged
in the bill of lading, the package limitation should be applied to
the number of cartons or bales, . . . placed in the container.' 39
According to DeOrchis, this suggestion could be implemented by
allowing the shipper to choose whether a container is to be used in
the first instance and noting this choice on the face of the bill of
lading. By permitting the parties alone to decide what is to be
deemed a package under their contract of carriage, DeOrchis con-
tended, "the pains of litigation and the search for predictability
would both be ended."'' 40
Seymour Simon has also concluded that the functional econom-
ics test is unsound."' He asserted that it unjustly penalizes the
shipper for taking advantage of the economic benefits derived from
containerization while leaving the carrier, who reaps far greater re-
wards, unscathed."' Simon criticized the test as bottomed in "an
23 375 F.2d at 946.
z' DeOrchis, supra note 3, at 258. DeOrchis feels that this "choice and description test"
is the best possible solution to the container problem. Under it, the shipper may choose to
load the goods into the container itself and thereby maintain control over how the goods are
packed. Alternatively, the shipper may elect to ship the goods to the pier to be packed in the
container by the carrier. In the former situation the package limitation would be applied to
the container as a unit while in the latter the limitation would apply to the individual items
shipped. Predictability is ensured under the test since the parties' intended characterization
of the container is determined by looking to the bill of lading. Id. DeOrchis dismissed the
objection that a bill of lading is in actuality a contract of adhesion favoring the carrier by
stating that usually the shipper supplies the description of the goods contained in the docu-
ment. Id.
4 Id. at 279.
' Simon, supra note 2, at 530.
22 Id. at 531. It is Simon's contention that the carrier realizes enormous savings by the
use of containerization, at times amounting to 90% of the cost of loading and unloading ships.
In contrast, the shipper's only saving is that produced by the utilization of less expensive and
less durable packaging. According to Simon, the functional economics test penalizes the
shipper by applying the $500 liability limitation to the container when the shipper employs
an economical form of packaging, but permits the carrier to retain the benefits it receives
from containerization. Id. at 521. Thus, Simon concluded that the economic impact of the
test is inequitable. Id. at 521-22.
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obsolescent mode of transport [of] days past."'' Further, he
argued that limiting damages to $500 per container in effect exoner-
ates the carrier from liability and thereby contravenes a key objec-
tive of section 4(5) which is to prevent carriers from limiting their
liability to unconscionable amounts.' In concluding, Simon took
issue with the position adopted by Mr. DeOrchis, characterizing it
as "untenable,"'' and recommended the analysis of Leather's Best,
wherein the Second Circuit indicated that a container is a part of
the ship and cannot be considered a COGSA package."'
Another viewpoint is espoused by Henry J. van Wageningen
who observed that the balance between carrier and cargo interests
which COGSA was designed to strike has not been achieved as the
decisions presently are tilted in favor of the carrier. "7 Contrary to
the Second Circuit's view, van Wageningen urged that the term
package clearly is not a word of art; if it were, there would not be
such confusion as to its meaning.' The differing interpretations of
the Second and Ninth Circuits concerning the definition of the term
package,'49 coupled with the fact that it may be unknown to the
"I Id. at 531. Simon pointed out that there are practical difficulties that courts will
encounter in future years if the standard for determining whether a package is functional
relies upon the tensile strength, composition, and dimensions of packaging used years before.
Id. at 522.
"I Id. at 531. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 491 F.2d 960, 962
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451
F.2d 800, 815 (2d Cir. 1971).
"I Simon, supra note 2, at 536. Simon rejected DeOrchis' claim that the package limita-
tion issue was merely a question of allocation of risk which could be resolved by ensuring that
proper insurance coverage is procured. If the shipper's insurance coverage is relied upon to
abrogate carrier liability, Simon claimed, the objectives of COGSA as well as the common
law principle of holding a bailee responsible for loss or damage to another's property would
be thwarted. The shipper also would be paying extra insurance premiums to recover that
which should rightfully belong to it under COGSA. Id. at 533-34. Moreover, Simon disagreed
with the wisdom of allowing the bill of lading to influence whether a container is deemed a
package, stating that the COGSA provision should be interpreted to effectuate the legislative
intent and not that of the parties. Id. at 535-36.
" 451 F.2d at 815. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
V' an Wageningen, supra note 3, at 195.
i' Id. at 196.
' Liability for goods shipped in containers may differ significantly depending upon
which circuit is the forum for the litigation. For example, in Matsushita 11 containers, each
holding approximately 600 cartons of electrical equipment, suffered water damage with the
total loss stipulated at $21,749.75. 414 F. Supp. at 898-99. The district court held that each
individual carton was a package to which the $500 limitation was applicable. Accordingly,
the carrier was held liable for almost the entire loss. Id. at 907. If the action were brought in
the Second Circuit, however, the containers probably would be deemed COGSA packages,
see notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra, and the carrier's maximum liability would
be $5500.
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parties at the outset which circuit will have jurisdiction over a dis-
pute, 5 " lead that commentator, with some justification, to express
concern that both the carrier and the shipper will be forced to pro-
cure insurance coverage for the same cargo. 5'
As a solution to the problem, van Wageningen suggested that
the judiciary construe the term package to include shipping units
and "leave the 'customary freight unit' measurement to apply ex-
clusively to bulk and similar cargoes.115 2 In this manner, the courts
in the United States would reach uniform results and be in harmony
with the courts of those countries that adhere to the Hague Rules.'53
Under this interpretation, each item shipped, regardless of its outer
package, would be a shipping unit to which the $500 limitation
would apply. 15 Secure in their expectations, the parties could allo-
cate insurance risks accordingly.'55
It is submitted that, as the aforementioned authorities have
concluded, the functional economics test is unsound and should be
discarded. Although the test was adopted to provide a uniform solu-
tion for the container problem, it has not only failed to achieve this
objective, but has shown itself to be commercially impractical as
well. "'56 In assessing the effectiveness of the test, one must bear in
mind that the primary purpose of containerization is to promote
I' Since admiralty jurisdiction is in rem, either circuit ultimately may possess jurisdic-
tion over an action. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 186-87. Therefore, to protect
themselves, both the shipper and carrier would have to insure the cargo.
s Van Wageningen, supra note 3, at 196.
152 Id. at 197. See note 153 infra. In addition to this judicial solution, van Wageningen
suggested certain legislative remedies, the most significant of which is an amendment to
conform COGSA to the package or unit terminology of the Hague Rules, see note 19 supra,
and to render the maximum liability provision inflation-proof by converting it from a dollar
to a percentage limitation. Van Wageningen, supra note 3, at 198.
'1 The Hague Rules limit a carrier's liability to a specific monetary amount per package
or unit. It is this terminology which was adopted by Canada and most European countries.
See notes 19 & 21 supra. Since the courts of these countries have interpreted the word unit
to mean virtually the same as package, it makes little difference how an article is character-
ized under the Hague Rules. In the United States, however, the distinction between a pack-
age and a customary freight unit may result in a carrier being held liable for $500 if an item
is considered a package and thousands of dollars if it is determined to be several customary
freight units. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
's' Van Wageningen, supra note 3, at 197-98.
,s Id. at 198. In actuality, the shipper would ultimately bear the risk of loss since the
freight rate would reflect the carrier's insurance costs. The shipper would insure against loss
in excess of the carrier's liability either through his own underwriter or by paying a higher
freight rate in return for increased liability on the part of the carrier. Id. at 200.
' Under the functional economics test, the mere fact that the shipper did not use
packaging suitable for overseas shipment may result in the carrier's liability being limited to
$500 even though the actual damage incurred by the shipper exceeds $40,000 or $50,000. See,
e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
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efficiency in the shipping industry.'57 Although the largest benefits
under containerization accrue to the carrier in the form of time
savings and labor cost reductions, the shipper is also rewarded be-
cause the expensive packaging formerly required for overseas break-
bulk shipment may be avoided.'58 Presumably, this benefit will be
passed on to the consumer through the market mechanism. In the
interest of predictability, however, the Second Circuit has elimi-
nated this latter advantage by basing a presumption upon the hypo-
thetical and seemingly irrelevant consideration of whether the indi-
vidual packaging used by the shipper would have been suitable for
shipment. Since an unfavorable presumption arises if the packaging
is determined to be unfit for such a shipment, the shipper is unjustly
penalized for taking advantage of a cost saving device made possible
by modern container technology. The test thus promotes economic
waste, as the shipper is compelled to use heavier protective packag-
ing to avoid the burden of an adverse presumption. Recent cases
suggest that this presumption can rarely be overcome.'59
Moreover, although an avowed goal of the functional economics
test is the attainment of predictability by permitting the carrier and
shipper to allocate risk of loss at the time of contract,"'0 in practical
effect it has left the parties uncertain of their respective rights.
Instead of providing a solution applicable to every situation, the test
results in liability being imposed on a case-by-case basis. In each
situation, two issues always must be resolved. First, a determination
must be made regarding whether the individual packaging was
functional. This leads to a presumption that the container is or is
not a COGSA package. Second, the intent of the parties must be
ascertained to determine whether it rebuts the presumption. In light
of the fact that thousands of dollars of potential liability hinge on
these questions, it is quite likely that the parties would resort to
extensive and costly litigation for a resolution of them. 6' Thus, the
functional economics test, which was intended to reduce the likeli-
hood of suit, actually may lead to increased litigation.
Interestingly, in determining the parties' intent, the Second
'' See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
' See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973)
(shipper did not rebut presumption that parties intended the container to be the COGSA
package); cf. Baby Togs, Inc. v. S.S. American Ming, 1975 A.M.C. 2012 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(carrier unable to rebut presumption that cartons were COGSA packages).
See Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1973).
"' See DeOrchis, supra note 3, at 258.
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Circuit has relied upon the characterization of the container appear-
ing in the bill of lading. Previously, however, the court had observed
that these documents often are contracts of adhesion drafted and
issued by the carrier, and, as such, are hardly indicative of the
parties' mutual intent. 6' By placing such importance upon the par-
ties' private definition of the term package as evidenced by the bill
of lading, the Second Circuit has thus departed from its prior recog-
nition that a major purpose of COGSA "is to protect shippers from
the overreaching of carriers through contracts of adhesion ....
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONAL ECONOMICS TEST
In view of the realities of today's maritime industry, it is sug-
gested that the $500 COGSA package limitation should operate
against the party deriving the greatest benefits from containeriza-
tion. Containerization evolved primarily due to carriers' beliefs that
the procedure is more economical and efficient than older meth-
ods.' 4 Indeed, carriers who resisted containerization were elimi-
nated, or, at the very least, have opted for more specialized cargo
or decided to transport breakbulk and containerized cargo on the
same vessel.
Clearly, where the container is owned and supplied by the car-
rier, it is the carrier who benefits most from containerization.'65
Even if the container is loaded at the shipper's premises, the shipper
is merely using the tools of the carrier's trade and, in effect, assist-
ing the carrier in reducing overall costs. The shipper's primary ad-
vantage is the convenience of having the container available when
it is ready to load, rather than awaiting delivery by the carrier.
In considering the situation where the container is owned and
supplied by the shipper or freight forwarder, it is important to note
,62 See Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1300 (2d Cir. 1974); Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11-13 (2d Cir. 1969);
Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375
F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
"' Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291, 1300 (2d Cir. 1974). See note
162 and accompanying text supra. By providing a standard and uniform set of provisions for
ocean bills of lading, COGSA attempted to redress the imbalance in bargaining power which
existed between the carrier interests and cargo owners. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1969); note 2 supra.
6I By reducing operating costs and increasing efficiency, containerization has enabled
carriers which formerly were marginal money-makers to become highly profitable enterprises.
See FoRBs, Sept. 1, 1977, at 47.
,M5 See Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 5, at 208; Simon, supra note 2, at 521; note 27
supra.
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that the number of such containers is exceedingly small. Should
these containers be considered packages simply because the shipper
is using a "non-vessel" container? It is submitted that this factor
should have no effect in most cases. The carrier is in business to
carry container cargo. Containers, like railroad cars, are inter-
changeable when they are the proper size. Whether the carrier uses
its own container or that of a freight forwarder makes little differ-
ence to it. In fact, use of the shipper's container allows the carrier
added flexibility, especially if some of its own containers are lagging
at some inland point or are in a state of disrepair. Although the
shipper may benefit by having the container at its warehouse ear-
lier, or by receiving a discount rate, the carrier still obtains the
major savings.
There are situations, however, in which the container should be
deemed a package. In some instances, for example, the shipper uses
the container as a substitute for its own packaging. This occurred
in Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., '" where,
absent a container, the household goods would not have been
shipped in separate boxes. They would have been shipped in large
wooden crates or cartons approximately the size of the metal con-
tainer that was actually used. In such a situation, where the normal
packaging is rendered unnecessary by the metal container and con-
tainerization is primarily for the benefit of the shipper, it would be
unfair to treat each separately boxed item as a COGSA package.
Thus, regardless of ownership, a container should not be con-
sidered a package except when it is used by the shipper as a true
substitute for packaging or in other instances when containerization
is primarily for the benefit of the shipper.' Adherence to this rule
would result in the predictability desired by all concerned without
discouraging mercantile efficiency on the shipper's part or overlook-
ing the carrier's equities. Although not completely developed, the
Matsushita approach is a positive and encouraging step toward
achieving such a result.
,68 1976 A.M.C. 487 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed in notes 100-107 and accompanying text
supra.
'1 Other instances could conceivably exist in which containerization is primarily for the
benefit of the shipper. For example, if a shipper intentionally contracts on a per container
basis to obtain a significantly lower rate or rejects the carrier's offer of breakbulk shipment,
it might be possible to argue that the container should be considered a package.
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